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Abstract: There is limited trade in health services despite big differences in the price of health 
care across countries.  Whether patients travel abroad for health care depends on the coverage of 
treatments by their health insurance plan.  Under existing health insurance contracts, the gains 
from trade are not fully internalized by the consumer.  The result is a strong “local-market bias” 
in the consumption of health care.  A simple modification of existing insurance products can 
create sufficient incentives for consumers to travel.  For just 15 highly tradable, low-risk 
treatments, the annual savings to the US would be $1.4 billion even if only one in ten patients 
who need these treatments went abroad.  Half of these annual savings would accrue to the 
Medicare program alone.  We examine how measures by destination countries to improve and 
credibly signal the quality of health care can enhance the scope for trade. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Health-related expenditures account for nearly one-tenth of all expenditures in the OECD 
countries, and over one-seventh of GDP in the US alone (OECD, Department of Health 
and Human Services).
1  Outpacing the 7.7 percent growth in US health care expenditures 
in 2003 was the growth in health insurance premiums, which increased by 14 percent 
(Kaiser Family Foundation study, 2004).  As a result, many US employers are being 
forced to cut employee health benefits.
 2  According to the US Census Bureau (2004), the 
proportion of people covered by employer-sponsored health insurance fell 1.3 million 
from the previous year to 60.4 percent in year 2003.  The Institute of Medicine (2004) 
estimates that about 18,000 Americans die each year from treatable conditions because 
they cannot afford health care.   
 
The costs of health care and health insurance are significantly higher in the US than in a 
number of other countries.   For example, an inpatient knee surgery, 400,000 of which are 
performed annually in the US, costs over $10,000 in the US, but less than $1,500 at the 
best hospitals in Hungary and India.
3   According to the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (2002), over 71 percent of hospital costs are labor related, which helps 
explain why countries with low labor costs have a significant cost advantage in medical 
treatments.  Large savings could be realized if even a fraction of US patients went abroad 
for treatment.  But very few do so.   
 
Is health care so different from other goods and services that it cannot be regarded as 
tradable?  Consumers certainly value both proximity and quality but that has not 
prevented them from traveling abroad for a range of treatments, such as cosmetic 
surgeries, rehabilitative care, alternative medicine, and in some cases, even eye and 
cardiac surgery.  Estimates suggest that in 2003, over 350,000 patients traveled to Cuba, 
India, Jordan, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, specifically to consume health care 
services.  A significant number were patients from industrial countries, traveling to a 
growing number of overseas medical centers to obtain “first-world treatments at third-
world prices”.
4 
   
                                                 
1 The rapid advances in medical technology, increased market power in the hospital sector, higher 
prescription drug costs, and an increasingly aging population are often cited as the main cost-drivers 
fueling the rise in US health spending (see e.g., Alliance for Health Reform, 2004).  To a lesser extent, 
generous malpractice awards and higher administrative costs for insurers also contribute to rising health 
care costs.     
 
2 A typical employer pays for 73 percent of premiums with the employee paying the rest.   
 
3 The prices outside the US include the cost of travel from the US.  The price differentials are even greater 
for more complicated surgeries such as Coronary Artery Bypass Grafts (CABG), which costs over $35,000 
in the US, but under $ 9,000 (inclusive of travel costs) in the best cardiac surgery centers in India and 
Thailand.  Source: CMS hospital reimbursement data and Apollo Hospital, Delhi. 
 
4 In 2003, an estimated 50,000 “medical tourists” traveled overseas from the UK for a variety of check-ups, 
treatments and surgeries, to Thailand, South Africa, India and Cuba (The Guardian, May 11, 2004).   3
The consumers who travel abroad for health care, however, are those whose care is 
inadequately covered by health insurance, or those who face long waiting periods in their 
home country.  The adequately insured do not travel.  Surprisingly, insurers not only fail 
to provide incentives for consumers to seek cheaper treatment abroad but, in a number of 
cases, they also dissuade them by making health insurance “non-portable” across borders.  
In the US, for instance, Medicare and Medicaid cover virtually no services delivered 
abroad, and most private health plans limit insurance coverage for treatments abroad to 
emergencies.  When plans do offer coverage overseas, the foreign providers are treated as 
out-of-network, rendering the consumer responsible for higher out-of-pocket costs.   
 
Using a simple model, we show that even if health insurance were neutral to the location 
of health care consumption, it would still act as a barrier to the realization of gains from 
trade.  Under a third-party payer health insurance system, the consumer of health services 
is responsible for only the deductible and the co-payment.
5  Thus, the consumer would 
have an incentive to go abroad for health care only if the out-of-pocket savings were 
larger than the travel costs, the psychological costs of receiving health care in a foreign 
environment, and the costs of any perceived (or actual) medical risk.  Since the consumer 
does not reap the full gains from trade but must bear the full costs of traveling abroad for 
treatment, there is a strong “local-market bias” in the consumption of health care.   
 
We show that a simple modification of existing insurance products to adequately cover 
the travel and other costs of going abroad can create sufficient incentives for consumers 
to realize the gains from trade.  This modification would neither curtail consumers’ 
freedom of choice nor accentuate the ex-post moral hazard problem that arises with 
insurance.   
 
In order to illustrate the magnitude of the potential gains from trade, we undertake a price 
comparison of commonly performed surgeries between the US and 20 countries around 
the world.  For just 15 highly tradable, low-risk treatments, the annual savings for the US 
would be $1.4 billion even if only one in ten patients who needed these treatments went 
abroad. The scope for trade would be greatly enhanced if hospitals and physicians in 
destination countries improved and credibly signaled their quality, and we make some 
suggestions on how this might be accomplished. 
 
The rest of the study is organized as follows.  In section 2, we describe the coverage of 
health care received abroad under existing health plans such in the US.  Section 3 lays out 
the conceptual case for gains from increased trade in health using a simple model, and 
proposes a modification of existing insurance contracts.  Section 4 assesses the claim that 
it is not feasible to travel abroad for medical care.  An illustration of the potential gains 
from trading health care is presented in section 5.  Section 6 focuses on the impediments 
to extending insurance coverage for treatments overseas, emphasizing issues relating to 
US insurers such as Medicare, Medicaid and Managed Care plans.  Section 7 emphasizes 
strategies that destination countries can adopt to enhance the scope of health services 
trade.  Section 8 concludes.
                                                 
5 Many health plans have “stop-loss” provisions under which the insurer pays for 100 percent of the costs 
of health care after the patient meets their stop-loss limit for a calendar year (usually $2,000 to 3,000).   4
Table 1.  A summary of how US health plans treat health care received abroad 
 
Health care received overseas covered?  Plan  US population covered in 
year 2004 
Emergency care  Non-emergency care 
Medicare and 
Medicaid 
26% of US population 
(Mainly retirees, low-
income families & 
disabled people) 
Not covered, except when beneficiary is a border 
resident, and lives closer to the foreign provider than the 
US provider 
Not covered 
Tricare   3.5% of US population 
(Active duty and retired 
US military personnel 
and their families) 
Covered, with overseas network provider handling the 
claim filing.   
Covered, if beneficiary is stationed 






25% of all employees in 
the US with employer-
sponsored health 
insurance 
Covered, but as an out-of-network benefit requiring 
higher consumer cost-sharing.  Initially, beneficiary 
pays entire cost out-of-pocket and qualifies for 
reimbursement only when claim form and itemized bill 
are submitted to insurer upon return to the US.   
Not covered 
Point of Service 
plan (POS) 
15% of all employees in 
the US with employer-
sponsored health 
insurance 





55% of all employees in 
the US with employer 
sponsored health 
insurance 
Same as HMO.  However, some plans have a network of 
overseas providers who accept US insurance (e.g., Blue 
Cross Blue Shield) and would handle claim filing on 
consumer’s behalf. 
Not covered by most plans.  When 
covered, e.g., World Bank 
employee health plan, it is treated 
as an out-of-network benefit 
requiring higher consumer cost 
sharing. 
 
Sources: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2005), Tricare, Kaiser Family Foundation Study (2004), US Census Bureau (2004), Blue Cross Blue 
Shield Association, World Access, and the World Bank Medical Insurance Plan.  5
2.  Coverage of health care received abroad under existing health plans  
 
Table 1 presents a summary of how different health plans in the US treat health care 
received overseas.  Federally funded programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, which 
cover almost 26 percent of the US population, do not cover treatments received outside 
the U.S. as a matter of policy, except in special circumstances.
6   Even though Medicare 
beneficiaries can purchase supplemental “Medigap” insurance, it only covers emergency 
treatments abroad during the first 60 days of overseas travel.  The lack of adequate 
overseas coverage under Medicare becomes particularly burdensome for the growing 
numbers of US retirees abroad in countries such as Mexico and the Caribbean.  Other 
federal health plans, e.g., Tricare, which covers US military personnel and their families, 
do cover both emergency as well as non-emergency care received while the beneficiary is 
stationed overseas. 
 
Approximately 60 percent of the US population receives employment-based health 
insurance.  A majority of these health plans are managed care plans such as Health 
Maintenance Organization (HMO) plans, or Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) 
plans.  Most individual and group HMO plans contract with a network of health care 
providers, but restrict health care consumption by consumers to that network.  HMO 
beneficiaries are required to select a primary care physician who traditionally acted as a 
gatekeeper, essentially controlling referrals to in-network specialists.
7  As foreign 
providers are out-of-network, HMOs do not cover treatments obtained overseas, except in 
case of medical emergencies that occur while traveling abroad.   
 
PPO health plans also maintain a network of providers, but are more flexible in their 
coverage benefits, giving the consumer the option to consume health care from any 
provider they choose.
8  However, the consumer is responsible for higher out-of-pocket 
payments if the provider is out-of-network.  Overseas providers are treated as out-of-
network, and insurance coverage abroad typically only applies to medical emergencies.  
There are also Point of Service (POS) plans which offer consumers the option of 
obtaining care out-of-network like a PPO plan, except that the in-network portion of the 
plan is structured exactly like an HMO, with a primary care physician controlling 
referrals to in-network specialists. 
 
                                                 
6 US Statute, Title 42, Section 1395Y (a4) of the original Medicare (1965) plan states that “No payment 
may be made under part A or part B of this sub-chapter for any expenses incurred for items or services 
which are not provided within the US, except for inpatient hospital services furnished outside the US under 
the conditions described in section 1395F.”  The conditions are that the beneficiary be a US border resident, 
require hospitalization, and live closer to the foreign hospital than to the US hospital (see, e.g., CMS, 
2005). 
   
7 Some HMO plans offered by insurers such as Kaiser, Blue Cross of California, and Highmark are Direct 
Access or Open Access HMOs that do not have a gatekeeper primary care physician requirement.   
 
8 Interestingly, while PPO premiums are higher than HMO premiums, averaging $10,217 for a PPO plan 
covering a family of four versus $9,504 under an HMO in 2004, more than half of employees with health 
insurance coverage chose the former, with only about a quarter enrolling in HMO plans (see, e.g., Kaiser 
Family Foundation study, 2004).   6
Some insurers have taken steps to make international networks of providers available to 
their consumers.  The Blue Cross Blue Shield Association has contracted with a third 
party medical assistance company named World Access, to maintain a network of 
providers overseas.  Blue Cross Blue Shield has established a program called BlueCard 
Worldwide, which handles the billing, claims translation, and currency conversion for 
care received abroad from overseas providers.
9  Coverage for care received overseas 
varies from plan to plan, but non-emergency treatments received abroad rarely qualify for 
reimbursement.  Some multinational corporations and international organizations (e.g., 
the World Bank Group) offer health plans that reimburse their employees for both 
emergency as well as non-emergency care received worldwide, but treat the overseas 
provider as out-of-network, rendering the employees responsible for higher out-of-pocket 
costs when receiving care abroad.
10 
 
While this study focuses on the influence of health insurance on trade in health care for 
the United States, the broader issue is relevant also to other industrial countries.  In many 
European countries, a majority of the public is covered by public health schemes 
analogous to US Medicare and Medicaid.  These schemes have also had to deal with the 
possibility of consumers traveling abroad for treatment in response to rationing.  A 
judgment in a recent lawsuit filed by a UK resident who faced a long wait for a hip 
replacement in the UK, and proceeded to obtain the treatment in France without 
authorization from the National Health Service (NHS), has wide-ranging implications for 
trade in health services within the EU.  The British Court of Appeals judgment in the case 
of Mrs. Watts v U.K. Secretary for Health relied on a European Court of Justice ruling 
that “undue delay” should not be tied to NHS waiting list times, but rather be decided 
through clinical judgment on a case-specific basis, taking into account the seriousness of 
the condition, severity of pain or impairment, risk of deterioration, and any effect on the 
patient’s job (see R [Watts] v Secretary of State for Health, 2003).  This potentially opens 






                                                 
9 However, BlueCard Worldwide is not an insurance product. The consumer’s Blue Cross Blue Shield Plan 
provides the insurance coverage and adjudicates claims according to the member’s benefit plan.  
  
10 Recently, a new genre of health plans termed “Consumer-driven” plans, have been gaining popularity 
among employers and employees.  Enrollment in these plans is currently small at less than 1 percent of the 
population, but is rising (see e.g., Gabel, Lo Sasso and Rice, 2002).  These plans are based on the notion 
that giving financial incentives and exposing consumers to more cost sharing would motivate patients to 
seek lower cost providers.  In one type of consumer-driven plan, the employer establishes a health 
reimbursement arrangement (HRA), e.g., $1,000 annually, for each employee.  As an employee incurs 
qualified medical expenses, they can submit them for reimbursement until their HRA funds are exhausted.  
Then, the employee is responsible for 100 percent of medical expenses, until a deductible (e.g., $2,000) is 
met.  At that point, a regular health plan kicks in, covering most expenses (see e.g., Gabel and Rice, 2003).  
In principle, consumers could use their HRA funds to consume health care abroad, but given the newness 
of these plans, we do not have information on the extent to which consumers are availing of this option. 
   7
 
3.  Realizing the gains from trade in health services:  the problem and a proposed 
solution 
 
In order to demonstrate the dampening effect of health insurance on trade in health care, 
we recast the model used by Gaynor et al. (2000) in a trade context.  There are two 
countries, home and foreign.  Let x denote the quantity of a composite bundle of medical 
care services consumed by the representative home country consumer.  The home price 
of a unit of care is 1 p , and the foreign price for the home consumer is F p p + = 2 2
~ , where 
F represents all the costs (travel and psychological) of going abroad and acclimatizing to 
foreign surroundings while receiving care.  Assume that  1 p and  2
~ p  are set equal to the 
marginal cost of production in their respective countries and all prices are common 
knowledge.  Further, assume that the domestic price is higher than the foreign price 
inclusive of F, i.e., 0 ) ( 2 1 > − p p  so that there are gains from trade.   
 
The insurer offers the consumer an insurance contract defined by the parameters ) , ( θ M , 
whereM is the health insurance premium, and θ  is the coinsurance rate, ) 1 ( < θ .  The fact 
that the consumer is responsible for a proportion θ of the price of health care is the 
insurer’s response to the well-known ex-post moral hazard in the consumption of health 
care (see, e.g., Pauly, 1968).  For simplicity, assume that the insurance industry is 
competitive, and faces no other costs in both countries, so that a consumer’s premium is 
set equal to the expected value of claims payouts.  The zero expected profit condition for 
the insurance industry implies 
 
x p M . ). 1 .( θ λ − = , 
 
whereλ is the exogenously given probability that the consumer will need medical 
treatment.  In the absence of health insurance, the representative consumer has a demand 
curve  ) (p D x = for health care.  Health insurance modifies the demand curve to 





We shall show that the problem of under-consumption of health care abroad arises even if 
the insurer offers identical coverage of the costs of treatment per se irrespective of the 
location (even though as we saw above, insurers often discriminate against treatment 
obtained abroad).  Initially, the consumer’s effective price is  1 1.p θ  at home, and 
F p + 2 1
~ . θ abroad.  Although 0 ) ( 2 1 > − p p , that is there are gains from trade, the 
consumer will not go abroad if  F p p < − ) ~ .( 2 1 1 θ , implying that the gains from trade will 
remain unrealized.   8





























It can be seen from figure 1 that when the price is 1 p , the quantity of medical care 
demanded at home would be 1 x .  The consumer pays the health care provider a price 
equal to 1 1p θ , with his expenditure equivalent to the area of rectangle 1 OABx .  The insurer 
pays the provider 1 1) 1 ( p θ − , which is equivalent to the expenditure CB Ap1 .  The triangle 
BCD can be interpreted as the efficiency loss from moral hazard in this equilibrium.   
 
A possible solution 
 
A simple solution to the problem of under-consumption abroad is that insurers cover a 
proportion  ) 1 ( 1 θ − of not just the cost of health care obtained abroad,  2
~ p , but of the “full” 
price inclusive of travel costs and other costs,  F p + 2
~ .
11  The consumer would then face 
an effective price of treatment abroad of  ) ~ .( 2 1 F p + θ  which is lower than price of 
                                                 
11 Other costs could include the psychological costs of acclimatizing to a foreign environment, and the 




Foreign price =  F p + 2
~  







2 p  
2 x   1 x   x
p  
) ( 2p D θ
1 p  
Home country price   9
treatment at home, i.e.,  1 1 2 1 . ) ~ .( p F p θ θ < + .  It is obvious that if 0 ) ( 2 1 > − p p , then 
) .( 2 1 1 p p − θ is also positive, so that any gains from trade will always be realized.   
 
However, as Figure 1 shows, the insurer covering a proportion of travel and other costs 
with an unchanged coinsurance rate,  1 θ , would lead the consumer to demand a quantity 
equal to  2 x , which represents a higher level of consumption of health care relative to the 
home quantity 1 x .  In some situations, it may be possible to control for moral hazard 
leading to excessive consumption abroad through utilization reviews, e.g. verification ex 
ante of the need for treatment, as well as an objective verification ex post of the receipt of 
treatment.  But if such independent controls are not feasible, could the possible “over-
consumption” of health care imply a loss in welfare by accentuating the moral hazard 
problem? 
 
Modifying the solution to deal with ex post moral hazard 
 
We demonstrate that it is possible for the insurer to modify the insurance contract to 
ensure that the gains from trade are realized, without worsening the moral hazard related 
efficiency loss.  In effect, the insurer could offer the consumer a different “foreign 
coinsurance rate” applying only to consumption abroad.  Consider a coinsurance rate, 2 θ , 
such that the consumer chooses the original level of consumption ( 1 x ) even when faced 
with the lower foreign price 2 p .  This gives rise to a demand curve for foreign health care 
given by ) ( 2p D θ , and the consumer moves to point E, consuming  1 x  in the foreign 
country at a price of 2 p .  We can solve for the new coinsurance rate  2 θ  by equating the 
quantities from the two demand curves.  We have 
 
) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 1 p D p D x θ θ = = , 
 














When the consumer chooses to go abroad for treatment, his out-of-pocket expenditure is 
still area 1 OABx , but the insurer now pays the foreign provider only EB Ap2 , which 
represents a saving equal to the area  CE p p 1 2  compared to what the insurer would have 
paid a home country provider.  The insurer’s saving can also be written 
as 1 2 1 ). ~ ( x F p p − − , which would be distributed to the consumer in the form of a lower 
premium since there are zero expected profits in a competitive insurance industry.  
Comparing the premia in the two cases, 
 
1 1 1 1 . ). 1 .( x p M θ λ − = , and 
   10
1 2 2 2 )]. ~ ).( 1 [( x F p M + − = θ λ , 
 
gives us 1 2 M M < , since  ) ~ .( 2 2 1 1 F p p + =θ θ  and 0 ~
2 1 > − − F p p , by assumption.  This 
implies a lower premium for the consumer.  The consumer would clearly be better off 
since he now pays the same out-of-pocket expenditure, but a lower premium if he agrees 
to go abroad.  Further, the size of the inefficiency due to moral hazard is also reduced 
from the area of triangle BCD to that of GEB, if the consumer goes abroad.  Thus, if the 
moral hazard problem cannot be independently controlled, the lower premium serves as 
an instrument to give the consumer an incentive to travel abroad, while the higher 
coinsurance rate reduces the efficiency loss from moral hazard when the consumer 




If the cost of health care is lower overseas, then the insurer can design an insurance 
contract that is unambiguously welfare-enhancing.  There are two health plan design 
possibilities depending on whether or not ex-post moral hazard can be independently 
controlled for. 
 
a)  Possible to independently control for moral hazard 
 
If it is possible to independently control for moral hazard leading to over-consumption 
abroad e.g., through utilization reviews, then it is sufficient for the insurer to offer 
consumers identical terms of coverage for health care obtained locally and abroad, 
provided that the foreign price is defined to include also the travel and other costs of 
obtaining treatment abroad.   
 
Consider a numerical example.  As we noted above, a knee surgery costs $10,000 in the 
US, but only $1,500 (inclusive of travel costs) in Hungary.  Let us say that insurers 
establish that the standard psychological cost of going abroad for treatment is $1,000.  
Under a uniform 20 percent coinsurance rate (assuming a zero deductible for simplicity), 
a consumer would pay $2,000 out-of-pocket if they underwent treatment in the US and 
the insurance company would pay the US provider $8,000.  On the other hand, if the 
consumer chose to go abroad, he would be reimbursed 80 percent of the foreign price 
inclusive of travel and psychological costs ($2,500).  The consumer would end up 
making a net monetary gain of $500 (instead of an expenditure of $2,000 in the US) and 
the insurance company would pay $2,000 for the treatment (instead of $8,000 in the 
US).
12   
 
b) Not possible to independently control for ex-post moral hazard 
 
On the other hand, if it is not possible to independently control for moral hazard leading 
to over-consumption abroad, then the insurer can offer the consumer a choice between 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, there are insurance laws in some countries, e.g., Belgium, that prohibit making the insured 
richer than they were before purchasing insurance (source: Vanbreda).    11
two different health insurance contracts, i.e.,  ) , ( 1 1 θ M if the consumer prefers treatment at 
home, and ) , ( 2 2 θ M , involving a lower premium and a higher coinsurance rate, if the 
consumer is willing to go abroad for treatment for certain procedures.   
 
Such a scheme is not without precedent.  Most private insurance contracts apply different 
coinsurance (and deductibles) depending on whether health care is received from in-
network providers or out-of-network providers.
13   The proposed scheme would resemble 
such arrangements in that foreign providers could be treated as a separate provider 
“tier”.
14  The consumer would thus not lose any of the existing options, but be given an 
additional choice:  a contract with a lower monthly premium and a higher coinsurance 
rate if a pre-defined set of health care services are obtained from the cheaper foreign 
provider tier.  Incentives for time-inconsistent behavior, e.g., a consumer signing up for 
the lower premium contract but reneging on the requirement to go abroad at the time of 
treatment, can be neutralized by introducing a contract clause that stipulates higher 
consumer cost-sharing in the event of reneging, such that the consumer would pay the 
same amount ex-post as she or he would have under the “not willing to travel abroad” 
higher premium plan. 
 
 
4.  Is health care inherently non-tradable? 
 
The realization of the gains from trade hinges on the consumer’s willingness to travel 
abroad for health care.  There are a number of myths about trade in health care, and we 
devote this subsection to addressing the two most important ones: that patients cannot or 
will not travel; and that going abroad for health care (to developing countries) involves a 
significant compromise on quality. 
 
Myth 1: The sick cannot travel, so health care must be delivered at home. 
 
It is certainly true that many types of treatment must necessarily be delivered close to 
home:  e.g. when immediate attention is required, as in the aftermath of an accident, or 
when patients are physically incapable of travel, as in the case of a spinal injury.  
However, there are a large number of treatments where the patient can both wait and 
travel for treatment, e.g., for an elective hernia operation or eye surgery.  In fact, in some 
cases, e.g., substance abuse rehabilitation, the desire for privacy and anonymity can 
create a preference for treatment away from home.  That these are not merely 
hypothetical possibilities is revealed by the growing annual volume of “medical tourists” 
                                                 
 
13 Similarly, under existing health plans, consumers in the US frequently pay less for off-patent generic 
prescription drugs than for on-patent brand name drugs. 
   
14 Our proposal could differ from existing insurance schemes in that it would involve a lower premium, but 
could involve a higher coinsurance rate applying to foreign treatments to minimize moral hazard abroad.  
The difference would arise in cases where supply-side cost containment measures (e.g., capitation 
payments to physicians) or utilization reviews are infeasible to implement abroad, leaving demand side 
measures (e.g., coinsurance) as the likely choice of instrument to limit moral hazard. 
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from various countries that consume health care services such as cosmetic, dental, laser-
vision, orthopedic, and even cardiac surgery abroad (see Table 2).
15    
 










for health care 
(’02-’03) 
 Countries of origin of 
foreign visitors  
Treatments sought by foreign visitors 
Thailand  632,000  126,000  South and South East 
Asia, Europe, and the US 
Cardiac surgery, post-op care, 
cosmetic surgery, dentistry, cataracts, 
bone-related procedures 
Singapore  200,000  20,400  South and South East 
Asia, Korea, Japan, 
Australia, the UK and the 
US 
General surgery, Cardiac surgery, 
ophthalmology, Orthopedics, 
Gynecology & Urology 
Malaysia  103,000  75,000  Indonesia, India, Middle 
East, and the UK 
Cardiology, hematology, 
gastroenterology, neurology & 
cosmetic surgery 
India  150,000  62,000  Bangladesh, Middle east, 
the UK, Europe, and the 
US 
Cardiac surgery, joint replacements, 
ophthalmology & alternative 
medicine. 
Jordan  N/a  70,000  Yemen, Sudan, Libya, 
Algeria, Tunisia, and Iraq 
Cardiac surgery, correction of spinal 
injuries, cornea transplants & 
alternative medicine 
Cuba N/a  3,500  Central  and  Latin 
America, and the UK 
Cosmetic surgery, Vitiligo 
treatments, ophthalmology, joint 
replacements & neurology. 
Sources: Tourism Authority of Thailand, Singapore Ministry of Health, Khoo (2004), Malaysian 
Department of Statistics, Confederation of Indian Industry, South Asia Network of Economic Research 
Institutes (SANEI), the Jordan Times, and Cuba Travel USA.  “N/a” indicates that data was not available. 
 
We have presented estimates for destinations in developing countries because our interest 
is in trade motivated by differences in costs, but the numbers in Table 2 also include 
consumers from other developing countries who travel because the required care is not 
available in their own countries.  Medical tourists from industrial countries include both 
consumers without health insurance as well as those who are insured at home, but opt to 
have the surgery overseas anyway, either because of long waiting lists at home, or due to 
prohibitively high out-of-pocket costs.  For example, in the UK, as of 2004, over 41,000 
people were expected to experience a waiting time of six months or longer to have 
various surgeries under the National Health Service (NHS) scheme.
16  The NHS has 
responded by flying patients to neighboring countries such as France, Spain and Germany 
for orthopedic procedures, eye surgery, and otolaryngological procedures (UK 
Department of Health).
17   
                                                 
15  Relying only on their website and magazine write-ups, the Mediscapes company in South Africa reports 
getting about 50-80 bookings a month from parties in the US interested in procedures such as dental 
whitening, botox treatments, health check ups, and elective surgery (both cosmetic and other). 
 
16  Source: U.K. Department of health.  See http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk for detailed figures. 
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Besides people that travel abroad for health care, there are a growing number of US 
retirees in foreign countries such as Mexico and Japan.  According to a survey of retired 
Americans living in Mexico, 94 percent of those surveyed indicated that they would seek 
medical services in Mexico if Medicare benefits were available in Mexico (see Warner 
1999).  Medicare’s reluctance to offer coverage for care received overseas is especially 
surprising when one considers that other federal health plans such as Tricare (US military 
health plan) and VA (Veteran’s Administration) plans provide reimbursement for 
worldwide care. 
 
Myth 2: The quality of health care available in developing countries is significantly lower 
than in industrial countries. 
 
This statement is certainly true on average.  The relevant comparison is, however, not 
with the standard of an average developing country provider but with the standard of a 
provider likely to be used by a patient from an industrial country.  There is significant 
evidence that the upper end of the quality distribution of both professionals and hospitals 
in several advanced developing countries lies well above the minimum acceptable 
standard in industrial countries. 
 
First of all, a significant number of foreign-educated medical professionals have been 
deemed to be adequately qualified to work as health care providers in the United States.  
According to the American Medical Association (2004), the proportion of International 
Medical Graduates (IMGs, hereafter) in the total US physician workforce has increased 
by over 160 percent since 1970, and they now account for a quarter of the 853,187 
physicians in the US (see figure 2 below). 
 












                          Source: American Medical Association (2004) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Form E-112 is used to authorize a UK resident traveling to any other EEA country for the specific 
purpose of obtaining medical treatments, and is issued if the patient’s NHS consultant recommends 
treatment abroad, the patients primary care trust in the U.K. agrees to meet the cost of treatment, and if the 
treatment being sought is available under the other country’s state health scheme.   
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Interestingly, the top eight countries of origin of foreign physicians in the US are all 
developing countries (McMahon, 2004).  Indian educated physicians constitute, the 
largest group of IMGs in the US, accounting for 21 percent of all foreign educated 
physicians, and more than a quarter of IMG residents and research fellows, followed by 
Filipino, Cuban, Pakistani, Iranian, and Korean educated physicians (see table 3).  
Similarly, the OECD Human Resources for Health Care project (2000) reports that 
foreign-trained physicians comprise over 30 percent of the practicing physicians in the 
National Health Service of the UK.   
 
Table 3.  The 10 most prevalent non-US nationalities among International Medical  
               Graduates (IMGs) working in the US 
 
Country of education  Fraction of IMG physicians 
(%) 
Fraction of IMG residents 
and fellows (%) 
India 21  25.1 
Philippines 9  3.9 
Cuba 4.2  <  2 
Pakistan 4.2  6.8 
Iran 3.1  3.3 
Korea 2.7  <  2 
Egypt 2.5  2.7 
China 2.4  3.9 
Germany 2  <  2 
Syria 2  2.8 
Source: McMahon (2004) 
 
It is also significant that the numbers of foreign-graduate faculty at US medical schools 
doubled from 8,100 to 16,200 over the 1981-2000 period, accounting for almost a fifth of 
total medical school faculties in 2000 (Liu et al. 2000).  Again, India is the most 
important country of origin with a share of 18 percent, with a significant number also 
from other developing countries such as China, the Philippines and Mexico. 
 











                       
                                                
   S o u r c e :  Brush, Sochalski and Berger (2004) 
   15
Brush, Sochalski and Berger (2004) show that the share of foreign educated nurses in the 
total number of newly licensed registered nurses (RNs) in the US has been rising since 
1998, exceeding 14 percent in 2003 (see figure 3 above).  The growth in the share of 
foreign educated nurses in the US since 2001 is particularly noteworthy because it 
occurred despite an increase in the number of US-trained RNs.  Filipino nurses dominate 
the numbers of foreign RNs at 43 percent, followed by countries like Canada, the U.K., 
India, Korea and Nigeria. 
 
Developing countries not only provide a large number of medical professionals to 
industrial countries, but also have hospitals that are comparable to some of the best 
medical facilities in industrial countries.  In 2002, the Bumrungrad hospital in Bangkok 
received international accreditation from the Joint Commission International (JCI, 
hereafter) - the international arm of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health care 
Organizations (JCAHO), which is one of the leading organizations certifying hospital 
quality in the US.  The Bumrungrad treats over 300,000 international patients annually 
from 154 different countries, employs over 600 physicians and dentists on staff, most 
with international training and certification, and has state of the art equipment and 
facilities.
18   
 
Similarly, the Apollo hospital chain based in India has treated over 60,000 foreign 
patients over the last three years in a number of specialties, especially cardiac surgery and 
orthopedics.  It has maintained a success rate of 99 percent in the over 50,000 cardiac 
surgeries performed, which is on par with the surgical success rates of some of the best 
cardiac surgery centers (e.g., Cleveland Clinic) in the US.  The Apollo has several 
surgeons that have previously practiced in the US and UK on its staff and it now operates 
in 28 locations across Asia.
19  It is in the process of obtaining JCI accreditation.  The 
Apollo Health care Group in India is currently in negotiations with US and European 
insurers to design schemes whereby the latter’s clients would have the incentive to travel 
to India for certain types of elective cardiac and orthopedic surgeries (see e.g., Business 
Standard, 2005).   
 
The Crossroads Center in Antigua is another example of a world-class facility in a 
developing country.  Founded in 1998, it is now an International Center of Excellence for 
the treatment of alcohol, drugs and other addictive disorders.
20  Crossroads has an 
internationally trained staff and its 29-day inpatient rehabilitation program is closely 
modeled on US treatment programs (see e.g., Gonzales, Brenzel and Sancho, 2001).  
Treatment costs at Crossroads are a third lower than comparable facilities, such as the 
Betty Ford and Hazelden clinics in the US.  The center estimates about 70 percent of its 
clientele is from industrial countries such as the UK, US, and Canada. 
 
                                                 
18 More details available at www.bumrungrad.com  
 
19 More details available at www.apollohospitals.com 
 
20 See http://crossroadsantigua.org/website/index.html 
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5.  Estimating the gains from trade:  an illustration 
 
In this section, we undertake a cost comparison of selected medical treatments to 
illustrate the potential gains from trade in health care for the US.  The biggest challenge 
in making such a comparison is the difficulty in obtaining the relevant data.  We needed 
data on (a) prices of the surgeries in the US, (b) the magnitude of the demand for the 
surgeries in the US, (c) prices of the surgeries in other countries, and (d) differences in 
the quality of services between the US and other countries. 
 
Identifying tradable medical procedures 
 
The first step, however, was to identify the medical procedures that are clear candidates 
for consumption abroad.  It became apparent that it was only for surgeries that the cost 
savings are likely to be large enough to cover the cost of travel.  For minor treatments, 
e.g., the treatment of hypertension, the cost differential is too small to justify travel. 
Furthermore, purely diagnostic procedures, such as the interpretation of CT scans, are 
already being traded electronically cross-border, without requiring the movement of the 
patient to the foreign country.
21  In collaboration with medical professionals, we 
developed the following set of criteria:
22 
 
•  The surgery constitutes treatment for a non-acute or non-traumatic condition; 
•  The patient must be able to travel without significant pain or inconvenience; 
•  The surgery is fairly simple and commonly performed with insignificant rates of 
post-operative complications; 
•  The surgery requires minimal follow-up treatment on site; 
•  The surgery generates minimal laboratory and pathology reports; and 
•  The surgery results in minimal post-procedure immobility. 
 
Applying these criteria extremely stringently to the list of the 230 most commonly 
performed procedures in US community hospitals, published by the Agency for Health 
care Research and Quality, we selected 15 procedures for price comparison purposes.  
These procedures are listed in Appendix 1 along with data on patient volume, and 





Hospital mean and median “billed charges” were available for each procedure in the 
Health care Cost and Utilization Project (H-CUP, hereafter) Nationwide Inpatient Sample 
                                                 
21 The five radiologists working for Wipro Ltd., and based in India, who interpret 30 CT scans a day for 
Massachusetts General Hospital, are an example of such cross-border trade in health services that does not 
require movement of the patient to the foreign country.   
 
22  The criteria were developed after consultations with Drs Grizzard & Sorock at the World Bank Health 
Services Department.     17
database.  However, billed charges are a misleading indicator of the actual price of the 
procedure, since they are an inflated price on which provider discounts to the insurer are 
based.  Typically, only uninsured patients are asked to pay the hospital “billed charges”.  
Thus, while an uninsured patient may be asked to pay a hospital over $13,000 for a 
hysterectomy, an insured patient’s health plan may end up paying a negotiated discounted 
rate of only about $4,500 for the same procedure, with the insured patient paying only 
their $250 deductible and a co-payment.  The price for a procedure is made up of the 
insurer’s payments to the hospital, physician, anesthetist, and other professionals, and the 
patient’s co-payment. We now turn to the methodology for calculating each of these. 
 
In order to accurately estimate the prices of our selected procedures, we relied on the 
Medicare provider payment datasets made publicly available by the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS, hereafter).  For inpatient procedures, we first identified the 
relevant Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) code for each procedure from the DRG Expert 
coding manual, which also lists the national average payment Medicare makes to 
hospitals.
23  The hospital DRG payment rate varies by hospital, procedure, case 
complexity, and hospital resource use by the patient.  For example, the national average 
hospital payment rate for a knee replacement (DRG 209) is $9,261, whereas it averages 
only $4,206 for hernia repairs (DRGs 161 and 162).  For outpatient procedures, the 
hospital/facility fee was obtained from the Medicare Outpatient Prospective Payment 
System dataset.  Unlike inpatient DRGs, outpatient procedures are coded and priced by 
Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes.  For example, the facility fee for a toe 
deformity repair (CPT 29290) performed on an outpatient basis is $1,525, while that for a 
shoulder joint surgery (CPT 23470, 23472) averages $5,696.  See appendix 2 for details 
on hospital/facility payments for all our selected procedures. 
 
Physician payment rates were calculated from the Medicare physician fee schedule, 
which are listed by CPT code and setting (facility or physician office) for 92 different 
regions of the US.  We used the national average across regions for each procedure in a 
facility setting to calculate the physician’s fees.  For example, the national average 
physician’s fee for skin lesion removal (CPT 11426) was $238, while that for a cataract 
procedure (CPT 66983) was $592 (see appendices 2 and 3).  Medicare payment rates to 
providers are lower than those paid by private insurers, and much below what is paid by 
the uninsured; in fact, Medicare operates de facto as a large government administered 
PPO with a very aggressive rate structure for provider payments.  In 2001, Medicare 
physician payment rates were 83 percent of average private rates, having risen from 64 
percent in the mid 1990s (see e.g., Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2001). 
 
Anesthesiology fees are calculated based on the number of base units and time units (one 
time unit is 15 minutes of time) for a procedure, which is then multiplied by an anesthesia 
conversion factor that varies by region (see Medicare Claims Processing Manual).  We 
obtained the number of base units by anesthesia CPT code from the Medicare anesthetist 
fee schedule, assumed a uniform four time units for each procedure (as suggested by the 
                                                 
23 National Average Hospital Payment rate reported by the DRG Expert (2005) is calculated by multiplying 
the current relative weight of the DRG by the national average hospital Medicare base rate of $4,555.  
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CMS anesthetist fee payment department), and used the national average anesthetist 
conversion factor of $17.71 per anesthetist unit (see appendices 2 and 3 for an estimate of 
anesthesiology fees).
24  We then calculated the inpatient prices for our selected 
procedures in the US by adding hospital payments, physician fees and anesthetist charges 
for the year 2004 (Column 1, Table 4).   
 
Since outpatient treatments under Medicare are also subject to a patient co-payment, we 
used the minimum adjusted co-payment for reported by CMS for the relevant CPT codes.  
Examples of minimum co-payments include $157 for a glaucoma procedure and $370 for 
a prostatectomy procedure such as TURP.  We then calculated Outpatient prices by 
adding hospital fees, physician fees, anesthesia charges, and co-payments for the year 
2004 (Column 3, Table 4). 
 
Magnitude of Demand 
 
We also obtained patient volume data from the H-CUP Nationwide Inpatient Sample 
database.  The latest year for which H-CUP data were available was 2002.  However this 
dataset covered only inpatient treatments in US community hospitals for 36 US states 
(see Column 2, Table 4), and thereby excluded the large volumes of the selected surgeries 
that are performed in an outpatient setting (Column 4, Table 4).  Since, we were unable to 
find a centralized source of data on the number of outpatient surgeries by procedure, we 
had to collect outpatient volume data from a variety of sources.  In each case, we 
contacted the relevant professional organization of surgeons, e.g., the American Podiatric 
Medical Association provided data on the annual number of Bunionectomies (toe-
deformity repairs).  In some cases, we had to rely on outpatient volume estimates from 
health care research firms, e.g., OptiStock, a vision care research firm, provided estimates 
on the annual number of cataract procedures.  See appendix 3 for the detailed list of 




Vanbreda International, a Belgium-based employee benefits consulting and 
administration firm, whose clients include about 124 international organizations with 
operations in 185 countries, provided the data on international prices for the selected 
procedures in 21 countries from their own claims (see appendix 4 for details).  In order to 
make a meaningful comparison between US and international prices from a trade 
standpoint, we added the cost of round-trip airfare to these countries from the US to the 
international prices.  Since the psychological costs of going abroad are hard to quantify, 
and our focus is on the monetary gains from trade, we do not include the former in our 
cost comparison.  Further, since there can be a lot of intra-procedural variation in prices, 
we used the average of the three lowest foreign country prices for each procedure as the 
benchmark foreign price (Column 5, Table 4).  This minimizes any price bias arising 
from the paucity of claims data in certain countries.   
                                                 
24 The number of time units can be larger than 4 for a major surgery, while only one time unit may be 
charged for a minor procedure.       




Price comparisons would be much more credible if we could effectively control for 
differences in quality.  However, in the absence of more information, we can only 
implement two implicit controls.  First, as our selected procedures are routine and 
relatively uncomplicated, they do not require a relatively high level of surgical expertise. 
Hence, there is a presumption that there are not big quality variations for these 
procedures between the best hospitals in developing countries and those in developed 
countries.  Second, since Vanbreda’s clients abroad are mainly international 
organizations that have citizens from industrial countries on staff, their claims data from 
foreign countries reflects prices of procedures in the best hospitals in that country, 
thereby mitigating the quality differentials concern.  While these implicit quality controls 
are imperfect, no superior alternative was feasible given the lack of data on quality of 




The results of the cost comparison are illustrated in the last column of Table 4.  The 
column contains an estimate of cost savings that would accrue if ten percent of the 
number of patients requiring a procedure in the US instead chose to undergo the 
procedure overseas.
25  Since the patient volumes are for 2002, while the prices pertain to 
the year 2004, our calculation of savings assumes that annual demand for procedures 
stays unchanged.  In fact, studies have shown that the annual patient volumes for many of 
our selected procedures, e.g., knee and shoulder surgeries have displayed a rising trend 
over the last few years (see e.g., American Association of Orthopedic Surgeons). 
 
As shown in Table 4, the gains from trade are large. If one in ten patients currently 
undergoing these fifteen procedures in the US instead were treated abroad, the savings 
would amount to $1.4 billion dollars annually.  Based on the volume of Medicare patients 
in the H-CUP sample, we estimate that $690 million of these savings would accrue 
annually to the Medicare program alone.  If we expand the list of tradable procedures to 
include coronary artery bypass grafts, which are already being consumed abroad in 
growing numbers, the estimate of annual savings would exceed $2 billion.  
 
                                                 
25  It is conceivable that foreign prices for these services could increase in the short run with greater 
consumption by visiting foreign patients, but in the long run, higher revenues could be used to create 
additional capacity in foreign hospitals, thereby mitigating price increases.     20




Sources: Health care Cost and Utilization Project (H-CUP) database, 2002, Vanbreda International, and authors’ calculations.  An “N/a” denotes that data was 












Average of three 
lowest foreign 
prices including 
travel cost ($) 
Savings if 10% of 
US patients 
undergo surgery 
abroad instead of in 
the US ($) 
Knee surgery  10,335 399,139 4,142 60,000 1,236 380,604,366
Shoulder Arthroplasty  5,940 23,300 7,931 N/a 2,204 8,704,809
TURP 4,127 111,936 3,303 88,064 2,385 27,581,317
Tubal Ligation  5,663 78,771 3,442 621,229 1,248 171,065,574
Hernia Repair  4,753 40,553 3,450 759,447 1,608 152,655,706
Skin lesion excision  6,240 21,257 1,696 1,588,884 812 151,952,860
Adult Tonsillectomy  3,398 17,251 1,931 102,749 1,010 13,588,218
Hysterectomy 5,783 640,565 5,420 N/a 1,869 250,704,845
Haemorrhoidectomy 4,945 12,787 2,081 137,213 781 23,160,663
Rhinoplasty 5,050 7,265 3,417 N/a 1,906 2,284,315
Bunionectomy 6,046 3,139 2,392 41,507 1,487 5,186,290
Cataract extraction  3,595 2,215 2,325 1,430,785 1,133 171,078,116
Varicose vein surgery  7,065 1,957 2,373 148,043 1,393 15,618,521
Glaucoma procedures  3,882 - 2,292 75,838 1,017 9,670,440
Tympanoplasty 4,993 754 3,347 149,246 1,261 31,408,685
 
Total savings  1,415,264,725  21
Although this figure amounts to only a small proportion of total health spending in the 
US, the savings are nevertheless impressive for three reasons. First, the savings pertain to 
only fifteen treatments drawn out of a large universe.  Given that patients from the US 
and UK are traveling to India for major procedures such as cardiac surgery (see e.g., 
Srinivasan, 2005), the list of tradable procedures is arguably much wider.  Identifying the 
universe of tradable treatments would be a useful exercise but is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  Second, our estimate of cost savings is understated to the extent that we have used 
Medicare payment rates to calculate US prices, which are lower than those paid by 
private insurers and the uninsured, as noted above.  Third, patient volume data was not 
available for all procedure categories, and a fuller accounting would certainly magnify 




6.  Are there good reasons to deny coverage for treatment abroad? 
 
Given that there are large gains from trade in health care, it is a puzzle that insurers in 
countries with expensive health care deny coverage for non-emergency treatment 
obtained abroad rather than encourage patients to seek care overseas.  We consider 
possible reasons that have emerged from discussions with insurers.  
 
Insurer concerns about quality of overseas providers and malpractice law 
 
Insurers may care about the quality of the providers because of a potential negative 
spillover effect in the consumption of health care.  A consumer’s decision to receive care 
from low-cost overseas providers may prove expensive to the insurer if the treatment 
worsens health problems and the insurer is obliged to cover the costs of subsequent 
treatment.  The insurer may also be concerned that malpractice may occur in a foreign 
jurisdiction where the legal regime makes it difficult to sue care providers.   
 
It would make sense to deny the consumer the option of receiving cheaper treatment 
abroad for these reasons if two conditions hold true.  First, the insurer cares more about 
potential future cost implications of poor provider quality than consumers care about the 
impact of provider quality on their own health.  Second, the insurer is more concerned 
than the consumer about the difficulty in seeking compensation for malpractice abroad.  
These conditions cannot be ruled out but do not seem very plausible.  Moreover, if these 
concerns really exist then it should be possible to write contracts that insulate the insurer 
from bearing any additional costs that arise from the consumer’s decision to go abroad.
 26  
Quality concerns can be more directly addressed by creating provider networks abroad, 
as we describe in section 7 below. 
 
                                                 
26 One response to high costs of malpractice insurance in the US has been for American doctors to 
simultaneously practice in two countries, offering routine care at home, and performing procedures with 
higher surgical risk offshore, or in a foreign country.  This practice is becoming more common, and could 
simultaneously allay both quality and legal concerns. 
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Cost of monitoring health care consumption abroad  
 
Insurers may face high costs of monitoring care received overseas.  As discussed 
previously, ex-post moral hazard tends to make the consumer over-consume health care.  
To an extent, this problem can be addressed through demand-side cost-containment 
measures as shown in the model in section 3.  An insurer could also institute the 
requirement for objective verification ex ante by a US doctor (possibly in the insurer’s 
network) of the need for treatment, as well as an objective verification ex post of the 





Public health schemes such as Medicare and Medicaid face institutional impediments to 
extending coverage for health care received abroad.  These are government-controlled 
schemes and allowing participation of foreign providers would require an amendment of 
the Social Security Act.  The Medicare program, however, has built-in waivers, such as 
the CMS Section 1115 Research and Demonstration Waiver, which could be used to 
study alternative programs of cost-effective health care delivery overseas (see e.g., 
Warner, 1999, 2001).  According to Warner, coverage for care received overseas, 
especially in a neighboring country such as Mexico, could be extended through the 
introduction of a Point of Service (POS) option for Medicare beneficiaries, or through the 
introduction of a Medical Savings Account (MSA).
28  
 
Distorted incentives in oligopolistic markets 
 
The fact that federal programs such as Medicare and Medicaid do not offer coverage for 
health care received overseas could reflect implicit protection for domestic health care 
providers.  The bigger puzzle is why private insurers deny coverage for treatment abroad.  
One reason could be insurers’ inertia in a changing world (opportunities for trade are 
new, insurance business practices are old).   
 
Another speculative explanation may be the oligopolistic nature of the health insurance 
industry.  As appendix 5 shows, the three largest health plans account for well over 65 
percent of the market in a large majority of US states (see, Robinson 2004).  In a 
competitive market, insurers have no choice but to seek out the slightest cost advantage.  
Under an oligopoly, a different market equilibrium is possible.  One health insurer may 
benefit by offering consumers the possibility of consuming cheaper health care.  But if 
other firms follow suit, then its advantage would disappear.  It is possible that overall 
                                                 
27 It should also be possible to deal with administrative concerns about treatments received abroad, such as 
the difficulties with incorrectly coded or improperly translated claims through collaboration with insurers in 
the destination countries (see, e.g., Albro and Norton, 1997). 
 
28 MSAs are similar to the Health Reimbursement Arrangements discussed in footnote 10, but differ from 
the latter in that they are portable, earn interest, and can be used for expenses other than health care.  
Medicare beneficiaries using MSAs would be able to display, in more immediate terms, how much less 
expensive overseas health care is vis-à-vis the US.   
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profits would be lowered if health care costs declined as a result of the introduction of the 
possibility of consuming health care abroad (Mattoo, 2001).  The reason is that while 
firms would benefit from health care cost reductions, they could lose more from 
heightened competition in a low cost environment.  In these circumstances it is 
conceivable that the industry gravitates towards the sub-game perfect equilibrium where 
each firm chooses the strategy of not offering consumers the possibility of cheaper care 
abroad as long as other firms behave the same way.   
 
 
7.  What can developing countries do to increase the scope for trade? 
 
While this paper has focused on what inhibits foreign demand for care in developing 
countries, action is also clearly needed on the supply-side.  The scope for trade would be 
greatly enhanced if the quality of services provided abroad is improved, and this 
improvement is credibly signaled.  We have two suggestions. 
 
7.1 Accreditation  of  foreign hospitals 
 
One strategy for hospitals in developing countries that seek to attract foreign patients is to 
credibly signal their quality by obtaining accreditation from the Joint Commission 
International (JCI, hereafter).  JCI is the international arm of the Joint Commission for 
Accreditation of Health care Organizations (JCAHO), which is one of the leading 
organizations certifying hospital quality in the US.  Currently, there are about 14 JCI 
accredited hospitals and medical centers in developing countries, including the Einstein 
Hospital in Brazil, the Bumrungrad Medical Center in Thailand, the St. Luke’s Medical 
Center in the Philippines, and the American Hospital in the UAE Arab Emirates.
29  The 
number of JCI accredited hospitals is expected grow in the coming years, with hospital 
chains such as the Apollo in the process of obtaining accreditation.   
 
JCI accreditation standards are similar in rigor to the JCAHO standards that apply to US 
hospitals, but differ slightly, in order to accommodate: a) differences in health care laws 
and regulations across countries, b) differences across countries in the models that govern 
relationships between the medical staff, the hospital management, and the hospital 
governing body, and c) differences in other areas such as the interpretation of various 
terminologies used in the development and testing of international standards, and the 
laws and customs governing the informed consent process.
30   
                                                 
29 See the Joint Commission website at http://www.jcrinc.com/international.asp?durki=7656 for more 
details. 
 
30 For example, NFPA Life Safety Code for facility safety is specific to US circumstances, and may not 
appropriately fit into an international context, and thus it is not required by the JCI standards.  Similarly, 
JCAHO standards addressing medical staff bylaws are unique to the US model where physicians have 
admission and staff privileges at the local hospital, but are not directly employees of that hospital, as they 
are in many countries.  Finally, the informed consent process overseas, by law or by custom, may include 
other people in addition to the patient, such as the family unit, a spouse, parent, etc., a difference from the 
US practice, which JCI standards for informed consent have to reflect.  (Source: Anne Rooney, Executive 
Director, JCI)   24
 
Hospitals that undertake high volumes of relevant procedures are likely to be stronger 
candidates for accreditation, as studies have shown that surgical complications and 
mortality rates are inversely related to the volume of procedures (see, e.g., Birkmeyer et 
al., 2002 and Katz et al., 2002).  JCI accredited hospitals are responsible for renewing 
their accreditation every three years, and have to collect and report outcomes data on 
services rendered as well as quality indicators.  Studies have found a positive association 
between hospital performance reporting and hospital quality improvement efforts (see, 
e.g., Hibbard et al., 2003).
31   
 
The receipt of JCI accreditation by foreign hospitals could be used as the basis for 
selection to join the provider network of an industrial country insurer.
32  Foreign hospitals 
could also signal quality by establishing affiliations with reputed hospitals in industrial 
countries and mirroring their procedural standards, guidelines and clinical pathways.  
Foreign investment in the health care sector, sometimes inhibited by developing country 
restrictions, could also be a powerful vehicle for improvements in technology, 
managements and overall standards. 
 
7.2  Accreditation of foreign medical professionals 
 
The second proposal is for doctors and nurses in export-oriented health care organizations 
to credibly signal quality by passing, respectively, the United States Medical Licensing 
Exam (USMLE) and the US National Council Licensure Examination for Registered 
Nurses (NCLEX-RN).
33  Since foreign medical graduates that practice medicine in the 
US are obliged to pass these examinations, a natural extension from a trade in health care 
perspective would be to institute a similar requirement for foreign physicians in export-
oriented health care organizations abroad.  It is also possible that as part of the residency 
program for physicians, foreign medical boards could form partnerships with medical 
centers in developed countries involving an exchange of medical experts, for example, as 
in the partnership between the Methodist Health care System of San Antonio and Mexico 
(see Albro and Norton, 1997).  
 
Doctors that have passed the USMLE written and clinical skills exam, and have a 
sufficient number of training credits could be included in the overseas provider network 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
31 Hibbard et al. (2003) evaluate the impact of private versus public reporting on hospital performance on 
quality improvement.  They found that hospitals that received low scores in cardiac surgery and obstetrics 
initiated a higher level of quality improvement activities.  Also, quality improvement efforts in hospitals 
whose reports were made public appeared to be significantly greater than in hospitals given only private 
reports.   
 
32 For example, companies such as WGA, Frontera and SMI have successfully maintained provider 
networks across the US-Mexico border for almost 15 years.   
 
33 The first stage of the USMLE involves a test of medical science concepts, the second stage involves a 
test of clinical knowledge and skills, while the third stage assesses whether the candidate can apply medical 
knowledge and understanding of biomedical and clinical science essential for the unsupervised practice of 
medicine, with emphasis on patient management in ambulatory settings.   25
of industrial country insurers.
34   Further measures could involve hospitals and medical 
boards collecting data on outcomes and costs so that physician performance could be 
tracked using tiered network programs such as the ones used by insurers in the US (see, 
e.g., Fronstin, 2003, and Robinson, 2003).
35   
 
Familiarity with doctors from certain regions could also help in removing concerns about 
the quality of care.  For example, many British nationals reportedly seek treatments in 
India because they are familiar with the expertise of doctors of Indian origin in the UK.
36  
It may be possible for US insurers to offer a health plan option, for example, where an 
immigrant consumer is offered the option of undergoing certain treatments in his/her 




8.  Conclusion 
 
Our study has shown how existing health insurance plans inhibit the consumption of 
health care abroad by consumers.  Modifications of these health insurance contracts to 
adequately cover the costs of care received abroad would give consumers adequate 
incentives to undergo tradable treatments overseas.  We should emphasize that we are not 
suggesting that insurers should force patients to seek treatments overseas in order to cut 
costs but that insurers should offer patients the option of obtaining care overseas. 
 
Using price data from the Medicare program and Vanbreda International, we undertook a 
worldwide price comparison of 15 low-risk, highly tradable surgeries.  We included only 
non-emergency and routine surgeries, such as knee and shoulder arthroplasties, skin 
lesion excisions, toe-deformity repairs, and cataract extractions.  The magnitude of the 
gains from trade in just these 15 surgeries was estimated to be over $1.4 billion, even if 
only one in ten US patients chose to undergo treatment abroad rather than in the US.  Of 
these annual savings, $690 million would accrue to the Medicare program alone.   
 
The scope for trade would be greatly enhanced if quality abroad were further improved, 
and credibly signaled through international accreditation of export-oriented hospitals and 
                                                 
 
34 Currently, stages 1 and 2 of the USMLE can be taken abroad, while plans to set up overseas locations for 
the NCLEX-RN are still in the pipeline (Sources: National Board of Medical Examiners and National 
Council of State Boards of Nursing). 
 
35 For example, Aetna’s Aexcel program rates physicians by regional network (e.g., the 
Baltimore/DC/Northern VA region) and medical specialty, after controlling for patient volume, clinical 
performance, cost-efficiency, and network adequacy (see Aetna, 2004).  This is evidence of that fact that 
insurers are interested in identifying high-quality cost-efficient domestic providers in the US.  If foreign 
hospitals and medical boards were to collect and report outcomes and cost data on treatments provided by 
their physicians, then insurers could rate foreign providers on a similar basis and thereby maintain quality 
and cost standards for the overseas network as well. 
 
36 The Guardian, May 11, 2004.  
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medical professionals.  Insurers could then widen their networks to include these 
internationally accredited providers overseas. 
 
One concern pertains to the effect of trade in health care on the local health system of the 
destination country. Might the inflow of industrial country consumers crowd out poorer 
local patients?  This concern may be exaggerated for several reasons.  First of all, a large 
number of developing country doctors and nurses emigrate every year to industrial 
countries, as we saw in Section 4.  Inflows of rich country consumers could lead to higher 
incomes at home and a reduced incentive to emigrate.  Furthermore, in these 
circumstances, it would be possible to cross-subsidize care for the poor by taxing the 
increased export revenues or by requiring providers also to extend care to the poor.  
Finally, health care capacity in destination countries will not remain fixed, but is likely to 
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Knee Arthroplasty  399,139  28,032  4.0  0.1  37.2 
Arthroplasty other 
than hip or knee  46,037 20,898  2.7  0.2  41.2 
TURP 111,936  12,501  3.1  0.3  100.0 
Tubal  ligation  78,771  9,018  2.2 * 0 
Inguinal and femoral 
hernia repair  40,553 22,609  5.6  0.9  80.5 
Excision of skin 
lesion  21,257 20,970  5.6  0.8  48.0 
Tonsillectomy   17,251  10,250  2.0  *  56.0 
Hysterectomy  640,565  13,448  2.8 0.1 0 
Hemorrhoidectomy 12,787  12,656  3.3  *  50.8 
Rhinoplasty 7,265  16,772  3.0 *  59.0 
Bunionectomy   3,139  12,190  2.2  *  20.7 
Lens and cataract 
procedures  2,215 11,483  2.4  *  40.4 
Varicose vein 
stripping, lower limb  1,957 12,596  2.6  *  42.1 
Glaucoma  procedures  *  9,955  2.0 * * 
Tympanoplasty
37  754  11,983  1.3 * * 
  
Source: H-CUP Nationwide Inpatient Sample, 2002.  Statistics based on estimates with a relative standard 
error (standard error / weighted estimate) greater than 0.30 or with standard error = 0 in the nationwide 
statistics are not reliable. These statistics are suppressed and are designated with an asterisk (*).
                                                 
37 Volume pertains to year 2000.   30























27437, 27446, 27447 879  11  195  10,335 
Shoulder Arthroplasty  223, 224  4,267  23470, 23472  1,443  13  230  5,940 
TURP 337  3,271  52601 696  9  159  4,127 
Tubal Ligation  361  5,124  58670, 58671  362  10  177  5,663 
Hernia Repair  161, 162  4,206  49650  388  9  159  4,753 
Excision of skin lesions  270  5,861  11426  238  8  142  6,240 
Tonsillectomy 59  2,924  42820,  42821 315  9  159 3,398 
Hysterectomy  358, 359  4,492  58550, 58553  1,113  10  177  5,783 
Haemorrhoidectomy 158  4,436  46255  349  9  159  4,945 
Rhinoplasty 56  4,137  30400  754  9 159  5,050 
Bunionectomy 225  5,456  28290  448  8  142 6,046 
Cataract extraction  39  2,861  66983  592  8  142  3,595 
Varicose vein surgery  119  6,524  37720  382  9  159  7,065 
Glaucoma procedures  46, 47  3,020  66150  702  9  159  3,882 
Tympanoplasty 55  4,150  69631  701  8  142 4,993 
 
Sources: DRG Expert 2005, Current Procedural Terminology (2004), Medicare Physician and Anesthetist Fee Schedules
                                                 
38 Anesthetist fees were calculated as the national average anesthetist fee of $17.71 per unit multiplied by the number of units. 
39 Inpatient prices equal the sum of hospital payment, physician and anesthetist fees.   31
























27447  2,569  879 195 499  4,142  60,000 
American Association 








2,078  696 159 370  3,303  88,064 
American Urological 
Association 
Tubal Ligation  58670, 58671  2,458  362  177  445  3,442  621,229  CDC 
Hernia Repair 
49650 
2,458  388 159 445  3,450  759,447 
National Center for 
Health Statistics 
Excision of skin 
lesions 
11426 
1,111  238 142 205  1,696  1,588,884 




1,232  315 159 225  1,931  102,749 
American Academy of 
Otolaryngology 
Hysterectomy 58550,  58553  3,505  1,113  177  624  5,420  N/a   
Haemorrhoidectomy  46255  1,330  349 159 242  2,081  137,213  Ethicon Endosurgery  
Rhinoplasty  30400  2,120  754 159 384  3,417  N/a   
Bunionectomy 
28290 





1,340  592 142 251  2,325  1,430,785 
Market Watch: Optical 
Sector report 2002 
Varicose vein surgery 
37720 
1,558  382 159 274  2,373  148,043 
American college of 
Phlebology 
Glaucoma  procedures 66150  1,273 702  159  157  2,292  75,838  Albright et al. (2002) 
Tympanoplasty 69631  2,120  701 142 384  3,347  149,246  CDC 
Sources: Current procedural Terminology (2004), and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
                                                 
40 Outpatient volume was calculated as total volume minus the H-CUP inpatient volume for each procedure.  An “N/a” indicates that volume was not available.   32
















BARBADOS             1,478 401 
BELGIUM 1,927  2,637  3,424  2,008  2,282  736  845  380 
BRASIL 5,088  5,627 5,638    2,763 1,931  2,717 961 
CHILE 3,733  4,966  4,825  2,755  3,071  1,607 1,965 857 
COSTA RICA      3,819      192  1,145  342 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 1,240              265 
EGYPT 2,738  1,734 1,743    1,062 573  364  715 
FRANCE 1,645  2,172  4,148 1,251 2,200  763  663  336 
GERMANY 3,144  3,619  4,505  982  2,787  929  994  337 
HUNGARY 637        1,317      415 
INDIA 662    1,263  113  701 512  175  1,008 
JAMAICA                
JORDAN 4,564        1,387  874  419  810 
MEXICO 4,706  7,773  4,224    3,686 3,086  3,288  410 
PERU 2,390    4,719    2,719  184  315 638 
PHILIPPINES 2,312  2,402  1,768    1,667  748  1,122  1,204 
POLAND 3,672  1,213      2,400    898  441 
SINGAPORE 5,381        3,913  4,515  3,967  808 
THAILAND 2,860  3,874  2,551    1,715  750  1,194  793 
TRINIDAD 
and  TOBAGO  2,249 2,249  1,928  803 884 578  884 500 
U.K. 4,955  6,199  7,190   3,158 2,334  3,090  307 
 
Sources: Vanbreda International, and Expedia.
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Appendix 4 (cont.): Calculation of Foreign Prices ($) 
 













BARBADOS  2,599  2,143          401 
BELGIUM 4,594  1,895 2,135  2,859  1,982  1,240  784  4,271 380 
BRASIL 5,198 1,941  3,266  1,832  3,923     961 
CHILE  5,524  2,359  3,432 2,972 2,426 2,439 1,232  3,741  857 
COSTA RICA  3,022        1,090        342 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC   166  1,727     875     265 
EGYT 2,298 738  1,677    1,096        715 
FRANCE  3,998  1,550  1,874 2,337 1,821 2,025 2,474  1,730  336 
GERMANY 5,096  1,402  3,709  3,426  1,970  2,555 618  2,818  337 
HUNGARY  354 80        293  415 
INDIA 1,260 489 792  396  240  469  1,008 
JAMAICA 3,145        1,064         
JORDAN 1,939  1,570 1,562  440  1,367  1,116  734    810 
MEXICO 6,106  5,745 3,930  3,307  1,827  3,175     410 
PERU 3,795  1,381  1,287  594  1,067   934    638 
PHILIPPINES  2,475  1,082  2,939    864 1,165 331  1,947 1,204 
POLAND         490  977     441 
SINGAPORE 6,781  3,996      2,375 4,707 1,274    808 
THAILAND 3,071  1,201    2,405  1,022  2,570 140  806  793 
TRINIDAD 
and  TOBAGO 2,490  916  2,249 1,478 2,892 1,124 1,478  1,928  500 
U.K.  11,036  3,152  4,565 3,982 4,426 4,681 1,779    307 
 
Sources: Vanbreda International and Expedia.  34
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Alabama 2,836  71  81  5,054  High 
Arizona 3,020  30  84  2,461  High 
Arkansas 1,343  56  74  3,283  High 
California 19,677  27  67  1,842  Moderate 
Colorado 3,651  19  41  883  Low 
Connecticut 2,507  57  78  3,629  High 
Delaware 543  59  84  3,931  High 
DC/NOVA 1,837  69  98  5,495  High 
Florida 8,583  30  65  1,758  Moderate 
Georgia 4,916  43  65  2,184  High 
Idaho 836  32  75  2,041  High 
Illinois 7,905  47  64  2,471  High 
Indiana 3,951  46  57  2,258  High 
Iowa 1,983  66  78  4,405  High 
Kansas 1,738  37  56  1,587  Moderate 
Kentucky 2,562  46  75  2,685  High 
Louisiana 2,217  41  66  2,058  High 
Maine 766  70  97  5,312  High 
Maryland 3,833  34  92  2,921  High 
Massachusetts 4,350  47 81  2,883  High 
Michigan 6,563  47  61  2,393  High 
Minnesota 3,745  53  89  3,535  High 
Mississippi 1,584  47  59  2,356  High 
Missouri 3,812  36  71  2,111  High 
Montana 476  59  67  3,490  High 
Nebraska 1,112  54  72  3,160  High 
Nevada 1,203  17  40  664  Low 
New Hampshire  860  66  100  5,275  High 
New Jersey  6,113  39  60  2,260  High 
New Mexico  884  25  65  1,541  Moderate 
 
Source: Robinson (2004)
                                                 
41 Antitrust concern is based on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) & Department of Justice (DOJ) 
thresholds.  An HHI below 1,000 denotes a low level of antitrust concern, between 1,000 and 1,800 denotes 
a moderate level of antitrust concern, and higher than 1,800 denotes a high level of antitrust concern.   35
Appendix 5: Commercial Insurance Enrollment, Consolidation, and Antitrust Concern  






















Downstate New York  8,191  26  51  1,497  Moderate 
Upstate New York  3,659  26  69  1,786  Moderate 
North Carolina  4,799  50  91  3,353  High 
North Dakota  395  51  N/a  N/a  N/a 
Ohio 7,859  33  62  1,677  Moderate 
Oklahoma 1,957  36  48  1,441  Moderate 
Oregon 2,195  43  66  2,282  High 
Pennsylvania 8,797  33  63  1,718  Moderate 
Rhode Island  894  56  100  5,071  High 
South Carolina  2,266  44  74  2,444  High 
South Dakota  462  56  69  3,305  High 
Tennessee 3,451  43  62  2,217  High 
Texas 11,116  32  55  1,428  Moderate 
Utah 1,571  32  70  1,767  Moderate 
Vermont 342  44  71  2,316  High 
Virginia 4,642  57  80  3,519  High 
Washington 3,764  27  66  1,796  Moderate 
West Virginia  819  43  58  1,972  High 
Wisconsin 3,405  17  39  689  Low 
Wyoming 275  44  64  2,105  High 
 
Source: Robinson (2004) 
                                                 
42 Antitrust concern is based on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) & Department of Justice (DOJ) 
thresholds.  An HHI below 1,000 denotes a low level of antitrust concern, between 1,000 and 1,800 denotes 
a moderate level of antitrust concern, and higher than 1,800 denotes a high level of antitrust concern. 